Empirical studies examining responses to new product entries come to the puzzling conclusion that, in general, an incumbent reacts to a new entrant after a significant delay. Even easy-to-implement price cuts are observed after significant lag following entry. These findings seem to contradict the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit competitive encroachment. When a competing firm enters the market, consumers may be uncertain about the entering firm's product quality. The incumbent firm (through rigorous tests) may fully know the entrant's quality. Suppose the incumbent aggressively lowers price. This may cause the consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant's quality is high. In other words, an incumbent's reaction may cause the consumers to make inferences about the entrant's quality. Such strategic implications of the incumbent's reactions have to be carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response by the incumbent.
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Empirical studies examining responses to new product entries come to the puzzling conclusion that, in general, an incumbent reacts to a new entrant after a significant delay. Even easy-to-implement price cuts are observed after significant lag following entry. These findings seem to contradict the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit competitive encroachment. When a competing firm enters the market, consumers may be uncertain about the entering firm's product quality. The incumbent firm (through rigorous tests) may fully know the entrant's quality. Suppose the incumbent aggressively lowers price. This may cause the consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant's quality is high. In other words, an incumbent's reaction may cause the consumers to make inferences about the entrant's quality. Such strategic implications of the incumbent's reactions have to be carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response by the incumbent.
In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for understanding differences in the magnitude and timing of incumbents' responses to competitive entries. We consider a model in which a monopolist incumbent firm faces competitive entry. The incumbent firm knows the true quality of the entrant with certainty. Although consumers are aware of the incumbent's product quality through their prior experience, they are initially uncertain of the entrant's product quality. In such a situation, a high-quality entrant has the incentive to signal her true quality through her strategic price choice. However, the uncertainty about the entrant's quality is favorable to the incumbent in the sense that consumers believe with a high probability that the entrant's quality is low. As a result, the strategic incentives facing the incumbent and the entrant oppose each other. While the entrant wants to signal her high quality, the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so. We demonstrate that one way the incumbent can prevent the quality signaling is to select a higher than his optimal competitive (duopoly) price. In other words, the incumbent can prevent or "jam" the entrant's quality signaling by choosing a price higher than his optimal competitive price when consumers are fully informed about the entrant's true quality. Though the signal-jamming price is lower than the monopoly price, the price is substantially higher than the competitive price. This marginal reduction in the incumbent's price from the pre-entry monopolistic price represents a muted or lack of response by the incumbent to the competitive entry. However, once the entrant's quality gets revealed in subsequent periods through consumer usage and word of mouth, the entrant has no incentive to engage in quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam it. Therefore, the market reverts to the complete-information competitive prices, and the incumbent lowers his price considerably. This temporal pattern of muted price reduction in the first period followed by a sharp price reduction in the second period corresponds to a delayed defensive reaction in our model. Although the empirical studies suggest that the delayed reaction may arise due to factors such as managerial inertia or indecision, we demonstrate that such a behavior is indeed an optimal strategy for a profit-maximizing firm. Thus, our model reconciles empirical results with the equilibrium outcome of a strategic analytical framework.
Furthermore, in an experimental setting, we test the predictive power of our framework and establish that consumers indeed form conjectures about the entrant's quality based on the incumbent's reactions. In the first experimental study, we find strong support for the notion that the incumbent's price reaction may indicate entrant's quality. In a follow-up study, we observe that whenever the incumbent lowers prices, respondents judge the quality of the entrant to be higher as compared to the case when prices are the same or increased. The managerial implication of this paper is that well-established incumbent firms should be cautious in the implementation of their defensive responses to product introductions of uncertain quality by competitors. Of particular concern are situations where the reactions are easily observable by consumers. A strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously, leading consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor's product. (New Product Entry; Defensive Reaction; Quality Signaling; Price-Quality Relationship; Signal Jamming; Asymmetric Information) 
Introduction
Competitive reaction to entry has received considerable attention in the marketing and economics areas. As entry intensifies competition, incumbent firms must lower prices in response to entry. The following anecdotal evidence exemplifies this expectation:
In 1975, Bristol-Myers introduced Datril, an acetaminophen (non-aspirin) analgesic, to the market. The major player in the nonprescription analgesic market then was Tylenol, which was produced and marketed by McNeil Labs, a subsidiary of Johnson and Johnson. Datril was introduced as a low-priced alternative to Tylenol. Two weeks before Datril's introduction, McNeil Labs responded by reducing the price of Tylenol to the trade by 30%. In addition, in 1975, McNeil Labs increased their advertising budget to promote Tylenol from an estimated $2 million in 1974 to $8 million.
Observe that the incumbent, which was the dominant firm in the pre-entry period, responded to the new competitive threat immediately. Interestingly, however, incumbents often do not respond immediately. Consider the following anecdote that buttresses this point:
Gatorade, introduced in 1966, is the major player in the sports drink market. In 1991, it held a 86.6% market share (Beverage World 1992). The first set of competitors included Suntory Water Group's 10-K, which entered in 1986, Powerburst in 1989, and Pepsi's Mountain Dew Sport (later changed to All Sport) in 1990 (Supermarket News 1990) . Despite these new entrants that were lower priced, Gatorade maintained high price levels. In 1990 Coca-Cola introduced PowerAde nationwide through fountains and subsequently in cans and bottles. The defensive response to the new competitors was made in 1993 when Gatorade engaged in price wars with PowerAde (BrandWeek July 12, 1993) . Surprisingly, this delayed reaction is not an isolated example and, in fact, is a widely observed strategy. In a study based on the Strategic Planning Institute's (SPI) start-up business data pertaining to 199 new product entries, Robinson (1988) observed a pattern of delayed responses by the incumbent firms. In particular, defensive price reactions, which are the easiest to implement, are also often delayed. Similarly, Bowman and Gatignon (1995) also observed delayed responses in the PIMS database. They note that in 28.7% of the cases, the defensive responses to new product entries occurred after more than a year; in 18% of the cases, it occurred between six months and a year; and in only 13.4% of the cases was there an immediate defensive response. Given such contrasting patterns of defensive response by the incumbent, the following questions naturally arise: Why do some incumbents choose to respond immediately to the competitive threat while others elect to delay their responses? What are the institutional features and strategic considerations that prompt incumbents to delay their defensive reactions? We set out to examine these issues here.
Economic theory would suggest that competitive responses occur because, in the pre-entry period, the incumbent is a de facto monopolist and hence sets monopoly profit-maximizing prices. However, after the new product entry, the market structure changes to a more competitive situation that leads an incumbent firm to reduce his price so as to limit competitive encroachment. This observed pattern of decrease in the incumbent's prices in the post-entry period relative to the pre-entry period can be conceptualized as defensive response by the incumbent.
A Brief Overview of the Model, Main Results, and Intuition
We consider a stylized model in which there is an incumbent firm that faces competitive entry.
1 Consumers in the market are aware of the incumbent's quality by virtue of buying its product in the past. However, they are uncertain of the entrant's quality. (The literature on pioneering advantage suggests the uncertainty related to the later entrant's quality as a rationale for first-mover advantage; see Schmalensee (1978) and Robinson and Fornell (1985) for additional insights.) In contrast, the incumbent through reverse engineering and market research, can correctly gauge the quality of the entrant. Clearly, such a strategy is too costly for any individual customer.
What should the entrant do when consumers are uncertain of her 2 quality? For exposition, consumer uncertainty can be thought of as if the consumers were facing either a low-quality entrant or a high-quality 1 Our focus is on the nature of price competition in the post-entry period. Thus, we abstract away from strategic considerations facing the incumbent in the pre-entry period such as entry deterrence and limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Srinivasan 1991). entrant, but they are not sure. The credible signaling strategy of the high-quality entrant is to separate herself from a possible "ghost" low-quality entrant. Essentially, the high-quality entrant must select a strategy such that it is too costly for any low-cost entrant to select the same strategy to imitate and hide her low quality. (In fact, the low-quality entrant prefers to select an optimal strategy, even if her low quality is revealed, rather than imitate.) When such different strategies would be adopted by the high-and low-quality entrants, consumers, on observing the entrant's strategy, must correctly infer whether the entrant quality is high or low. The literature in the quality-signaling area suggests that a high-quality entrant should raise prices to signal higher quality (Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Milgrom and Roberts 1986) . The reasoning is that if the entrant's quality and hence cost of production are high, any decrease in volume due to higher prices would hurt the low-quality entrant with a lower cost more than the high-quality entrant. Therefore, at sufficiently high prices, the low-quality incumbent would prefer to select a optimal low price and be known as the lowquality entrant instead of imitating the high price to avoid revelation of low quality. Consequently, when a high price is observed, consumers must correctly infer that the entrant's quality is high.
These signaling strategies have been studied in the context of a monopolist firm attempting to inform uncertain consumers. What sets our analysis apart from these studies is that we are considering a competitive market with an incumbent offering a product of known quality. In this context, consider a high-quality entrant competing with the incumbent and facing uncertain consumers. As before, the entrant would try to select a high price to signal high quality. Note that while consumer uncertainty is unfavorable for the high-quality entrant, it is favorable for the incumbent who knows the entrant's high quality. Therefore, the incumbent's and the entrant's incentives oppose each other. While the entrant wants to signal her high quality, the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so. One way the incumbent can prevent the quality signal is to select higher than optimal duopoly price (that is, higher than duopoly prices that are much lower than the monopoly prices). By doing so, the high-quality entrant is forced to raise prices even higher to signal quality. More important, as we demonstrate in this paper, the efficiency of higher price as a signal decreases with increasing price of the incumbent. Consequently, the entrant's ability to signal declines when the incumbent raises the price. In fact, the incumbent through higher price selection can prevent or "jam" the entrant from engaging in quality signaling. We reiterate that the duopoly prices are much lower than the monopoly prices. Thus, even when the incumbent selects a higher than duopoly price to jam the entrant's signal, his price is below the monopoly price. This marginal price reduction represents a muted or lack of price response to the entry. Once the entrant is in the market place, her quality would get revealed over time as consumers buy the product and use it. (Note that even when the quality signal is jammed, the entrant achieves positive sales.) After the quality of the entrant is eventually learned, the entrant has no incentive to engage in quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam it. Therefore, the market reverts to the informed duopolistic competition, and thus the incumbent lowers his price considerably. This temporal pattern of muted price reduction in the first period followed by sharp price reduction in the second period represents the prediction of delayed reaction in our model.
We believe that even to the reader less familiar with the signaling analysis and logic, our model offers a compelling intuition. At the risk of being somewhat imprecise, when the incumbent aggressively reacts to competitive entry by sharply lowering his price, consumers may wonder if the entrant's product is superior or better. This notion constitutes the genesis of our analysis. Apart from a rigorous analytical formulation deriving this intuition, we also subject it to experimental tests. The experimental verification is not an elaborate test of the model; rather, it aims to assess whether the central premise of the model has any face validity. In the first experimental study, from a number of competing explanations for delayed reaction, respondents chose our intuition as the most important reason. In a second experiment, we closely examine the underpinnings of our model explanations. Our results support the notion that when the incumbent lowers price, respondents expect the entrant's quality to be high and vice versa.
We recognize that the incumbent, besides pricing, can utilize other elements of the marketing-mix elements to respond to the competitive threat. For instance, in the context of product strategy this could entail either repositioning the existing products on the quality dimension (Hauser and Shugan 1983) or broadening the product line(s) by introducing new products. Such strategic considerations have an intrinsic time dimension and thus can be considered as delayed reaction. Yet it is unclear as to why immediate price reaction (that can be modified before responding with other marketing-mix elements) is still not an optimal strategy. Another example also underscores this point. The aggressive price and non-price response by Pepsi to an entry by Coke into its segment has led to the conclusion, "All the counterattacking by Pepsi legitimized the (Coke) product" (Wall Street Journal 1990) . The timing of competitive response, therefore, has significant strategic implications. In the context of our analysis, we find that when consumers are uncertain about the entrant's quality, the incumbent firm must be careful in deciding the optimal response to entry. Given that the incumbent's ability to test and identify the quality of a product far exceeds that of any individual consumer, it is reasonable for consumers to expect that firms are aware of each other's quality. Any aggressive attempt by the incumbent firm may lead the customers to view the incumbent's strong defensive reactions as an implicit acknowledgment of the competitor's strength in the marketplace. In fact, such beliefs may enhance the attractiveness of the competitor's product. The incumbent's defensive strategies, given the above consideration, will vary depending on whether or not such strategies are easily observable by the consumers. For example, price and advertising responses are more visible to consumers as compared to trade promotions. Thus, a firm that aims to respond vigorously and immediately but does not want consumers to view the entrant's product favorably may select discreet alternatives such as trade promotion and salesforce incentives.
Managerial Implications
The conceptual framework that we propose and the strategic considerations impacting on the incumbent's timing of defensive response that we highlight are of particular managerial relevance in those cases when the entrant's reputation for delivering high quality is nonexistent or weak. When a new firm with limited or no prior track record enters a market, the quality uncertainty is likely to exist. Such uncertainty may also be prevalent even for established firms when they enter new segments or when they adopt new technologies. In these markets, incumbent firms will have to examine the optimal timing of their defensive reactions.
Related Literature
Defensive strategies by incumbent firms to new competitive threats have received considerable attention in the literature. While the literature has focused primarily on the direction (Hauser and Shugan 1983) , intensity (Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen 1989) , and scope (Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985) of the incumbent's responses, a few empirical studies in marketing have examined the timing of competitive response to new product introductions (Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Robinson 1988) . As mentioned earlier, the empirical findings have indicated a variety of responses and particularly delayed responses by the incumbent firms (Biggadike 1979; Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Chen, Smith, and Grimm 1992; MacMillan, McCaffery, and Van Wijk 1985; Robinson 1988) . This empirical finding of delayed response is contradictory to the normative literature (Hauser and Shugan 1983; Kumar and Sudarshan 1988; Porter 1985) that either implicitly assumes immediate response (or is silent on the timing issue) or explicitly advocates immediate responses. For example, Porter (1985, p. 498) recommends that "as a general rule, quick and vigorous retaliation is necessary."
The contradiction between the normative models and the empirical findings has led to conjectures in the literature to account for this discrepancy. For instance, Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen (1989) ascribe the lack of initial reactions by incumbent firms to their "inability to respond effectively." They argue that firms may be uncertain about the best way to respond to competitive actions or may lack the managerial expertise to do so. Extending this argument, Bowman and Gatignon (1995) hypothesize that firms operating in relatively more stable market environments may be inefficient in processing competitive information and thus delay responses as compared to firms operating in unstable environments. Though it is plausible that managerial inefficiency or indecision is likely to cause delay in response by the incumbent, it is hard to claim that all delays are likely to be caused by managerial ineptitude or indecisiveness. Another conjecture by Bowman and Gatignon (1995) is that an incumbent's reaction will be faster in a market with a high growth rate. In such rapidly growing markets, possible capacity constraints may suggest delayed rather than immediate reaction. Also, low growth markets become a zero-sum game arena. In these markets, incumbents may react immediately to retain their market share. More important, for these conjectures, it is unclear as to why delayed reaction emerges as the optimal strategy for a profit-maximizing incumbent.
3
In any event, our experimental study provides a measure of direct comparison of the relative importance of the various explanations. The explanation that consumers may infer the entrant's quality based on the incumbent's reaction is viewed as the most likely reason. While the usual caveats of interpreting experimental results are readily applicable, at a minimum, 3 In a market where consumers face switching cost (Klemperer 1987) , an incumbent firm's incentive to respond immediately is somewhat mitigated since the switching cost limits the competitive encroachment by the entrant. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this reason. We show that even when switching cost is absent, delayed reaction may be an optimal strategy due to signaling considerations.
the finding underscores the importance of the explanation developed in this paper.
The Model
In this section, we lay out the model formulation and discuss the main assumptions. In § 2.1, we characterize the consumer behavior assumed in our analysis. In § 2.2, we derive the demand functions facing the incumbent and the entrant.
Consumer Model
Let q I be the quality of the incumbent's product and let q E be the quality of the entrant's product. We assume that even though all consumers value higher levels of quality, they are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for incremental quality. We capture this aspect of consumer heterogeneity by assuming that the marginal willingness to pay for quality, ‫,ץ‬ is distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 1] . Consumers purchase at most one unit of the product in any time period. Consumer purchase decision is dictated by the standard utility maximization framework. Thus, a consumer will purchase the product (either the incumbent's or the entrant's) whenever the expected value of the product exceeds the market price and will select the brand (either the incumbent's or the entrant's product) that yields the highest surplus.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that consumers differ in their valuation of quality. Let the set of potential consumers correspond to the interval [0,1] with a uniform distribution and total mass N. Without any loss of generality, we normalize the mass of potential consumers to be unity, i.e., we set N ‫ס‬ 1. In the following analysis, we assume that the net surplus to the consumer located at h for a good of quality q at price p is given by u(q, p|h) ‫ס‬ hq ‫מ‬ p. This specification of consumer surplus function is similar to those used in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , Moorthy (1988) , Bagwell and Riordan (1991) , and Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) . 4 4 This implicitly assumes consumer risk neutrality and has been made for analytical simplicity. If consumers were risk averse, the Htype entrant would have a higher incentive to signal while the Ltype entrant would have a higher mimicking incentive. Thus, if the incumbent were to signal-jam, he would have to distort his prices up even further. This would mean even more "muted" initial reaction, thereby accentuating the phenomena of delayed defensive reaction. We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this issue.
Table 1 Demand Facing the Incumbent and the Entrant
Demand Functions
Demand Functions for the Incumbent and the Entrant
Consider the demand for a product of quality q at price p when only one brand is available (as is the case in the pre-entry period when the incumbent, firm I, is the monopolist). The set of consumers who will buy the product is of the form [h*, 1] where h* ‫ס‬ min {h: 0 Յ h Յ 1, hq ‫מ‬ p Ն 0}. Hence, in the pre-entry period, the demand facing the incumbent, when he is the monopolist, is given by (p) ‫ס‬ 1 ‫מ‬ (p/q I ), where the su-PE D I perscript PE refers to the pre-entry market structure.
However, when more than one quality is offered in the market (as is the case following the entry of the entrant firm, firm E), an individual consumer has to decide not only whether to buy at all but also select between the incumbent's and the entrant's products. In this case, we need to ascertain that consumer purchase decision satisfies two key constraints. The first condition is the Individual Rationality (IR) or participation constraint, which requires that for a consumer to purchase the product, he/she must derive a nonnegative surplus. The second condition is the Incentive Compatibility (IC) or self-selection constraint, which requires that if a consumer selects a product among various alternatives, it must be that he/she derives the highest surplus from the selected alternative.
Consider first the case of an incumbent offering quality q I (at price p I ) and the entrant offering quality q E (at price p E ) when the incumbent's product is of superior quality, i.e., q I Ͼ q E . It is obvious that for the entrant to have a nonzero market share, it is necessary that the entrant's price be less than the incumbent's, i.e., p E Ͻ p I . However, the condition p E Ͻ p I alone is not sufficient to ensure that the entrant will enjoy a nonzero market share. When q I /p I Ն q E /p E (i.e., "quality per dollar" is higher for the incumbent's product), all consumers h ʦ [0,1] prefer the incumbent's product to the entrant's product, provided they purchase any product because
and the set of potential consumers who do not buy the product at all is [0, h**]. Note that the IC constraint is trivially satisfied for the buyers of the entrant's product. Thus, the demand functions facing the incumbent and the entrant with qualities q E Ͻ q I are given by Equations (T1.1) and (T1.2) in Table 1 . Now consider the case when the entrant's product is of superior quality. In this case, for the incumbent to have a nonzero market share, it must be that p E Ͼ p I and q I /p I Ͼ q E /p E .
5 Under these conditions, the demand functions facing the incumbent and the entrant are given by Equations (T1.3) and (T1.4) in Table 1.   5 In our analysis, we make the routine assumption that the cost of quality function is convex. We further assume that this relationship is sufficiently convex such that the quality per unit price is higher for the lower quality product.
In the above discussion, we have assumed that the quality of the entrant's product is known to the consumers. However, immediately following the entry of firm E, consumers may be uncertain about the entrant's quality. Let q ʦ [0,1] be the prior probability that the true quality of the entrant is high and let 1 ‫מ‬ q ʦ [0,1] be the probability that the entrant's quality is low. 6 In this situation, the demand facing the entrant (and the incumbent) would depend on the consumers' beliefs about the entrant's quality q E rather than the entrant's true quality q E and hence the demand functions for the incumbent and the entrant can be obtained by substituting q E for q E in the above demand functions.
Observe that the demand function facing the entrant, D E (.,.) (both when q E Ͻ q I , Equation (T1.2), and when q E Ͼ q I , Equation (T1.4)), is increasing in the perceived quality q E of the entrant's product. This suggests that when the entrant's quality is uncertain, a high-quality entrant stands to gain (through demand enhancement) by favorably changing the quality perception of her product. This provides the necessary incentive for quality signaling by a high-quality entrant, provided she can credibly do so and signaling is not prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, the demand function facing the incumbent, D I (.,.) (both when q E Ͻ q I , Equation (T1.1), and when q E Ͼ q I , Equation (T1.3)), is decreasing in the perceived quality q E of the entrant's product so that any favorable change in the entrant's perceived quality hurts the incumbent. Thus, if the incumbent, through his strategic choice of marketingmix variables, can increase the cost of quality signaling by a high-quality entrant, he would optimally do so. This provides the intuition behind the "signaljamming" effort by an incumbent who knows the "true" high quality of the entrant in the face of (implicit) quality-signaling threat from a high-quality entrant. We summarize the above observation on the implications of entrant's perceived product quality on the 6 Consumers' priors may arise from their experience from related products: For example, consumers can base their expectations on the possible quality levels of computer monitors from televisions, of fax machines from photocopying machines, etc. 
Analysis
In § 3.1, we first describe the optimal pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant firm when consumers are aware of the quality of the entrant's product. The analysis serves to characterize the optimal "defensive reaction" of the incumbent firm when signal jamming is not a key strategic consideration. In § 3.2, we relax the assumption that consumers know the entrant's quality and analyze the implications for the optimal pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant using a two-period model. We assume that consumers are uncertain about the entrant's product at the beginning of the first period (i.e., immediately following the entry of the new firm) while the quality of the entrant gets revealed over time (i.e., at the beginning of the second period). Our analysis shows that, under conditions of incomplete information about the entrant's quality, it may be optimal for the incumbent to delay his reaction. In this case, the adjustment in the incumbent's pricing strategy from the pre-entry to the postentry levels does not occur immediately but rather over an extended time frame. This temporal pattern of incumbent's price underlies the notion of delayed (price) reaction.
Equilibrium Analysis When the Entrant's
Quality Is Known In the pre-entry period, the incumbent firm is a monopolist and as such charges a price that maximizes his profit. Since the focus of our analysis is to study the defensive reaction of the incumbent following the entry of a new firm, we assume that limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts 1982; Srinivasan 1991) is not an 7 Proof of all the lemmas and the propositions are given in the appendix. In the post-entry period, however, is no longer the PE p I optimal pricing strategy for firm I due to the fundamental change in the market structure. The equilibrium prices of the incumbent and the entrant firms in the post-entry period will critically depend on the relative qualities of the entrant's and the incumbent's product. Let q I and q E be the qualities of the incumbent's and the entrant's products and let c I and c E be their respective marginal costs. Then, the following two situations may arise: (a) entrant's product is of inferior quality, i.e., q I Ͼ q E , and (b) entrant's product is of superior quality, i.e., q I Ͻ q E .
First, we consider the case when the incumbent's product is of superior quality. The pricing problem faced by the incumbent, for any given price of the entrant, p E , can be formulated as Program P1 given in Table 2 (Equation (T2.1)).
Thus, the reaction function of the incumbent while competing against an entrant with an inferior product is given by
(1)
Note that the incumbent's reaction function R I (•) is increasing in the entrant's price, p E , i.e.,
Since both the entrant and the incumbent select their duopoly prices simultaneously, the entrant faces a similar situation. The pricing problem faced by the entrant, for any given price set by the incumbent, p I , can 8 This implicitly assumes that the cost structure of the incumbent is known to firm E before making the entry decision. This is reasonable because from the pre-entry pricing strategy of the incumbent firm, the entrant can infer the marginal cost of the incumbent. In the absence of asymmetric information on the marginal cost of the incumbent, limit pricing in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Srinivasan (1991) is not an equilibrium outcome.
be similarly formulated as Program P1Ј given in Table  2 (Equation (T2.2)). Thus, the reaction function of the entrant while competing against an incumbent with a superior product is given by
E E I E E I E I
It is easy to show that the entrant's reaction function R E (•) is increasing in the incumbent's price as well as increasing in the entrant's quality and marginal cost, i.e.,
Equations (2) and (4) reflect the fact that under Bertrand competition, the reaction functions are upward sloping, implying that pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant are strategic complements (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 1985) . 9 The Nash-equilibrium prices of the 9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation. Table 3 . Now, consider the case when the entrant's product is of superior quality. In this case, the optimal pricing strategies faced by the incumbent and the entrant can be modeled as Programs P2 and P2Ј given in Table 2 (Equations (T2.3) and (T2.4), respectively).
As in the previous case, it can be shown that when q I Ͻ q E the reaction functions for the incumbent and the entrant are given by
respectively. It can be further shown that these reaction functions are upward sloping in the competitive price.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant when the entrant's product is superior:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium post-entry prices for the incumbent and the entrant when the consumers know the entrant's true quality and the entrant's product is of superior quality are as given by Equations (T3.3) and (T3.4) , respectively, in Table 3 .
As the following proposition demonstrates, the incumbent's optimal price in the post-entry period is always lower than in the pre-entry period regardless of whether he faces an entrant with a superior product or an entrant with an inferior product: Proposition 3 implies that when consumers know the entrant's quality with certainty, the incumbent's reaction will be immediate. Once the incumbent has adjusted his pricing strategy from the pre-entry monopoly level to the post-entry duopoly level, he would have no incentive to change his pricing strategy. Thus, when the entrant's quality is known, a delayed price response from the incumbent is not optimal.
Equilibrium Analysis When the Entrant's Quality Is Uncertain
We now consider the more general case of post-entry price competition between the incumbent and the entrant when consumers are uncertain about the entrant's quality. This is a reasonable assumption, especially when the firm sponsoring the new product is not a reputed firm. Consumers know the quality of the incumbent's product, q I , through their prior experience with that product. We, however, assume that the incumbent is aware of the true quality of the entrant's product. The rationale for our assumption about the asymmetry across consumers and the incumbent regarding the entrant's quality is as follows: Recall that the attribute characterizing the product in quality-signaling literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995) is conceptualized as an experience attribute, i.e., that dimension of a product's quality that cannot be ascertained prior to purchase/consumption. However, the consumer learns the true level of the attribute through consumption experience. Our analysis rests on the notion that the incumbent firm can ascertain the true quality of the entrant's product easily through mechanical testing or reverse engineering. Doing so, however, is prohibitively costly for an individual consumer.
To capture the consumer uncertainty regarding the entrant's quality, we assume that q E ʦ { , }, where
denotes the quality of the entrant's product if the H q E entrant is a high-quality firm and denotes the qual-L q E ity of the entrant's product if she is a low-quality firm. 10 We further assume that
[0,1] be the prior probability that the true quality of the entrant is high and 1 ‫מ‬ q ʦ [0,1] be the probability that the entrant's quality is low. We assume that the quality of the entrant gets revealed at the beginning of Period 2 provided some consumers buy the entrant's product in Period Our assumption that the entrant's quality gets fully revealed at the beginning of Period 2, while consistent with extant quality-signaling literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995) , is clearly an abstraction of reality. Note that in these two-period stylized models, time period needs to be interpreted in an informational sense rather than a temporal sense. Further, if in our model, entrant's quality were to be gradually revealed over time through word of mouth in the spirit of Bagwell and Riordan (1991) , we conjecture that this would imply that the incumbent's price, instead of dropping instantaneously in Period 2 in the current formulation, would converge more gradually to the full-information duopoly level. This would observationally imply further "delay" in the incumbent's defensive response. We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this issue. 12 The basic idea behind this assumption of perfect correlation between quality and cost is that higher quality entails higher cost of production. This implicitly assumes that lower quality of the entrant is not attributable to technological inefficiencies. We thank anonymous reviewers for suggesting clarification on this issue. low-quality entrants, respectively. For notational convenience, we shall refer to the high-quality entrant as the H-type entrant and the low-quality entrant as the L-type entrant.
Our analysis under asymmetric information about the entrant's quality underscores the following issues: As in the monopoly case (Wolinsky 1983; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Bagwell 1991) , the H-type entrant can signal her high quality by distorting her initial postentry price upwards in the duopoly case as well. However, unlike in the previous cases, the incumbent who knows the "true" quality of the entrant can manipulate the signaling cost of the H-type entrant by distorting his initial post-entry prices upwards. Thus, under certain parametric conditions, the incumbent can increase the H-type entrant's signaling cost. In fact, when the H-type entrant's signaling cost is sufficiently raised, the entrant's attempt to signal quality may no longer be optimal. We call such equilibrium the signal-jamming (SJ) equilibrium. 13 Because of signal jamming, the initial post-entry price of the incumbent is higher than the (long-term) equilibrium duopoly levels. After the entrant's quality gets revealed through word of mouth, the incumbent reduces his prices to the duopoly levels. We interpret this temporal pattern of incumbent's price wherein the incumbent "reacts" to competition gradually over time as 'delayed' defensive response.
We obtain these results by employing the sequential equilibrium concept (Kreps and Wilson 1982) . Essentially, the concept requires that (a) each type of entrant firm selects her optimal pricing strategies, given optimal action on the part of the incumbent firm and the consumers; (b) the incumbent selects his optimal pricing strategy, given optimal type-contingent strategies of the entrant firm and optimal strategies of the consumers; (c) individual consumers make optimal buy/ no buy decisions given the optimal pricing strategies of the H-type and L-type entrant firms and the incumbent firm and given their beliefs about the entrant's 13 Note that this definition of signal-jamming is somewhat different from that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) . Unlike in their case, the signal-jamming action (incumbent's first-period pricing) is observable (though, in SJ equilibrium, it is not informative since his prices are the same whether it is the H-type or the L-type entrant). It is similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) in the sense that signal jamming interferes with the inference problem faced by the uninformed player (entrant in their model, consumers in this model).
type; and (d) wherever possible, consumers update their beliefs about the entrant's type using Bayes' rule. In the following analysis, we restrict our attention to equilibria arising from pure strategies. The focus of our analysis is on the so-called separating and pooling sequential equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, the first-period pricing strategies of the two types of the entrant differ and, therefore, consumers can correctly infer the entrant's quality. On the other hand, in a pooling equilibrium, the first-period pricing strategies of the H-type and the L-type entrants are the same and, therefore, consumer posterior belief is the same as the prior belief. Note that the Bayesian updating allows arbitrary beliefs for out-of-equilibrium paths, raising the possibility of a multiplicity of equilibria (Tirole 1988) . We employ the refinement of "elimination of dominated strategies" (Moulin 1979 ) and the "intuitive criterion" (Cho and Kreps 1987) to eliminate sequential equilibria supported by implausible out-ofequilibrium beliefs.
Quality Uncertainty and Strategic Considerations of the Entrant and the Incumbent.
Unlike the case when the entrant's quality is known with certainty, the strategic considerations facing the entrant and the incumbent are more involved. We discuss next the incentive for the high-quality entrant to engage in quality signaling and the conditions under which such signaling is possible (i.e., in technical terms, conditions for satisfaction of Spence-Mirrlees "single-crossing" property). We then discuss the incentive for the incumbent to engage in signal jamming and conditions under which this is possible.
Entrant's Incentive and Ability to Signal Quality in Duopoly.
When consumers a priori are uncertain about the quality of the entrant's product, they base the purchase decision on q I and the expected quality of the entrant's product, q E ϵ . 14 Since
Ͼ q E , a high-quality entrant stands to gain by re-H q E vealing her "true" higher quality. In the following proposition, we summarize this result, which provides 14 This simplification in the derivation of realized demand for the incumbent's and the entrant's products is due to the assumption of consumers' risk-neutrality. If consumers were risk averse, demand uncertainty will reduce the entrant's demand even further, thereby increasing the gains accruing to a high-quality entrant from quality signaling. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. the requisite incentive for the high-quality entrant to engage in quality signaling.
Proposition 4. The optimal profit of the high-quality entrant is increasing in her perceived quality given the price of the incumbent, i.e., /‫ץ‬q E Ͼ 0.
H ‫ץ‬P * E However, since both the high-and low-quality entrants stand to gain from favorable consumer beliefs, a mere assertion of superior quality will be discounted by rational consumers and hence cannot serve as a credible signal of high quality. 15 The H-type entrant can convey her superior quality by increasing, for any given price p I of the incumbent, her first-period price above her optimal price under complete information. The basic intuition is as follows: Recall that the marginal cost of the H-type entrant is higher than that of the L-type entrant, i.e.,
. As such, under con-
sumer uncertainty about the entrant's quality so that the price charged by the H-and the L-type is the same (being consistent with q E ), for any price p E selected by the entrant, the per unit contribution margin is higher for the L-type entrant than for the H-type entrant. Therefore, the opportunity cost of a loss in sales is higher for the L-type entrant. Thus, to deter mimicking from a possible L-type, the H-type entrant distorts the first-period prices to a higher level so as to limit the sales in the first period. 16 Our analysis suggests that the intuition behind higher price as a signal of higher quality is valid even under duopolistic market conditions. We formally demonstrate this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. For any given price of the incumbent, p I , the marginal losses resulting from any marginal upward price distortion are greater for the L-type entrant than for the H-type entrant. Therefore, for prices above the optimal price of the H-type entrant under complete information, the
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Note that in our stylized product market, there is only one entrant: either a H-type entrant or a L-type entrant. However, since consumers a priori do not know the entrant's true quality, the H-type entrant has to select an appropriate pricing strategy to credibly convince the uncertain consumers that she indeed is a H-type entrant. 16 Intuitively, the L-type entrant would want to adopt the strategy of a fly-by-night operator of selling as many units as possible before her true low quality gets revealed. Thus, to achieve a separation, the H-type entrant adopts the costly strategy of selling less than her complete information quantity by charging a higher price. The implication of Proposition 5 is that by distorting her price, p E , "sufficiently" above the complete information price level, , the high-quality entrant can H p * E deter mimicking from a "ghost" low-quality entrant. Thus, in the resulting separating equilibrium, the two types of entrants follow different pricing strategies. Therefore, by observing a "high" price, rational consumers correctly infer that the entrant's quality is high.
L-type entrant incurs greater losses than the H-type entrant
, i.e., L L H H ‫ץ‬P (q , p , c ) ‫ץ‬P (q , p , c ) E E I E E E I E Ն 1 ‫ץ‬p ‫ץ‬p E E H* for ∀ p Ն p ,(7)
Incumbent's Incentive and Ability to Signal Jam.
The key difference in the entrant's quality signaling strategy between monopoly and duopoly is noteworthy. Under duopoly, the high-quality entrant's marginal ability to separate from the "ghost" lowquality entrant depends on the pricing strategy of the incumbent. Essentially, the incumbent can "sufficiently" increase the high-quality entrant's cost of quality signaling such that quality signaling is too expensive to undertake. Recall, that the incumbent firm knows the entrant's true quality. Further, the incumbent recognizes the signaling incentive on the part of the H-type entrant. It is important to note that when consumers recognize a high-quality entrant correctly, the incumbent's profit is lower. Therefore, the incumbent has an incentive to prevent the entrant from credibly signaling her quality.
Proposition 6. The profit of the incumbent is decreasing in the perceived quality of the entrant given the price of the entrant, i.e., (•)/‫ץ‬q E Ͻ 0. ‫ץ‬P * I
The signaling cost borne by the H-type entrant depends on the H-type's marginal ability to separate, which is defined as the ratio of /‫ץ‬p E to /‫ץ‬p E .
L H
‫ץ‬P ‫ץ‬P E E
If, through his pricing strategy, the incumbent can reduce the H-type entrant's marginal ability to separate, the incumbent can increase the signaling cost of the Htype entrant, thereby making quality signaling more difficult. (As we note in the following proposition, the H-type entrant's marginal ability to separate is decreasing in the incumbent's prices.)
Proposition 7. The high-quality entrant's marginal ability to separate decreases as the incumbent's price increases.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: The ratio of the slopes of the L-type entrant to the H-type entrant decreases as the H-type entrant's price increases. As noted earlier, since pricing strategies of the incumbent and the entrant are strategic complements (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984; Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 1985) , the H-type entrant's prices are increasing in the incumbent's prices. By distorting his prices upward, the incumbent raises the H-type entrant's price (through the competitive effect), thereby reducing the H-type entrant's marginal ability to separate from the L-type entrant.
Proposition 8. The low-quality entrant's incentive to mimic the high-quality entrant increases as the incumbent's price increases.
Note that Proposition 7 suggests that the H-type entrant's ability to separate is reduced by upward price distortion by the incumbent. Moreover, Proposition 8 states that the L-type entrant enjoys greater incentive to pool with the H-type entrant. When taken together, these results clearly underscore the incentive for the incumbent to engage in signal jamming. The incumbent does it by selecting a price sufficiently high such that separation for the entrant is so costly that she prefers to pool. Clearly, the existence of such a signaljamming equilibrium will depend upon certain parametric conditions. As will become evident from the next section, the signal-jamming equilibrium prices are complex expressions and, therefore, we are unable to express the condition in a tractable way. We rely on numerical simulations to verify existence of signaljamming equilibrium over a range of parameter values.
Note that the incumbent facing a true L-type entrant may want to signal the entrant's type to consumers. However, the incumbent cannot credibly do so by choosing a price higher than the signal jamming price. The reason is that the marginal losses to the incumbent 
from such an upward price distortion are the same for both types of entrants.
3.2.2. Quality Uncertainty, Signal Jamming, and Delayed Defensive Reaction. Essentially, the incumbent signal jams the quality-signaling efforts of the H-type entrant by distorting his first-period price above his complete-information duopoly price. In the second period, however, the quality of the entrant gets revealed provided the entrant enjoys nonzero sales in the first period.
17 Therefore, the incumbent's prices converge to the equilibrium duopoly prices. We interpret this temporal pattern of the incumbent's price response occurring in the second period (instead of immediately following entry) as the empirically observed phenomenon of delayed reaction by the incumbent in the face of competitive entry. Before we offer details of our analysis, we describe the logic behind our approach. First, in Program P3 (Table 4) , we obtain the reaction function of the H-type entrant to any given price of the incumbent when the H-type entrant attempts to achieve least-cost separation. Subsequently, in Program P3Ј (Table 5) , we derive the incumbent's signal-jamming reaction function for any given price of the entrant. Moreover, the reaction function satisfies the constraint that the H-type entrant weakly prefers the pooling outcome to engaging in 17 In this paper, we do not consider the case when the incumbent, through manipulating his first-period price, can completely block out the entrant, i.e., the entrant has zero sales in the first period (as also in subsequent periods since the entrant's true high quality never gets revealed). If indeed zero sales for the entrant (i.e., entrant's exit from the market) were to occur in equilibrium, then entry of firm E in the first period cannot be an optimal strategy. Furthermore, such predatory pricing by the incumbent is illegal under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Alternatively, we can assume that in Period 2, the entrant's quality is always known with certainty. quality signaling. The pair of prices obtained by simultaneously satisfying the two reaction functions constitute the signal-jamming equilibrium.
Characterization of the
In Figure 1 , we graphically represent the signaljamming equilibrium. The curves in this figure represent the reaction functions of the incumbent and entrant, identified by appropriate subscripts, for the various informational scenarios.
(
resents the high-quality (low-quality) entrant's reaction function under complete information (obtained by substituting ( ) and ( ) for q E and c E , respec-
tively, in Equation (3) (3)).
(p I ) represents the re-QS R E action function for the high-type entrant corresponding to least-cost separation (see Lemma 3; Equation (8)). (pE) represents the incumbent's reaction func-R* I tion when it refrains from signal jamming (cf. Equation (1)). Finally, (p E ) is the incumbent's reaction func-SJ R I tion under signal jamming (see Lemma 4; Equation (11)). 
Optimal Pricing Strategy of the High-Quality Entrant Under Quality Signaling.
We first consider the reaction function of the H-type entrant when she engages in signaling her high quality through upward distortion of the first-period price. Let p I be any given price of the incumbent. Then, the pricing problem faced by the H-type entrant, given p I , when she attempts to credibly signal her quality can be modeled as Program P3 in Table 4 .
The logic behind the program formulation P3 is as follows: Constraint (T4.2) denotes the mimicking constraint for the L-type entrant. The left-hand side of Equation (T4.2) represents the L-type's profit, given p I , when she mimics the H-type's pricing strategy and, under the most favorable consumer beliefs, she is mistaken to be the H-type entrant (see Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) for additional discussion on the issue of formulating the L-type's mimicking constraint). We denote this profit by (p I ) where the first super-
script denotes the L-type entrant's true type, while the second superscript denotes consumer beliefs about the L-type under mimicking. The rationale behind taking the price of the incumbent, p I , as given is the Nash assumption of zero conjectural variation (Iwata 1974; Bresnahan 1987) . The right-hand side of Equation (T4.2) represents the L-type's profit, for any given p I , when she selects her complete-information price and consumers correctly infer her low quality, i.e., . We L q E denote this profit since both the entrant's true
P E (first superscript) and the perceived (second superscript) quality type is the L type.
Lemma 3. The optimal pricing strategy of the H-type, given p I , when she attempts to signal her high quality (at the least-cost signaling) is given by
Note that l I , which essentially reflects the "tightness" of the IC constraint of the L-type entrant, denotes the extent of distortion in the H-type's price required for credible quality separation (for any given price of the incumbent, p I ). Thus, l I ‫ס‬ 0 corresponds to the case when the mimicking constraint is non-binding so that the H-type entrant can achieve quality separation without any distortion. An immediate implication of Equation (9) is that ‫ץ‬l I /‫ץ‬p I Ͻ 0, which implies that the signaling cost borne by the H-type entrant is increasing in the incumbent's price (or, equivalently, the IC constraint of the L-type entrant is "tighter"). Therefore, the incumbent can raise his price in order to make quality signaling more expensive for the high-quality entrant. Furthermore, it can be shown that the H-type entrant's reaction function under quality signaling (as given by Equation (8)) is steeper than that under complete information (as given by Equation (3)). Thus, for any given price of the incumbent, p I , the H-type entrant selects a higher price under quality signaling. This result is consistent with the upward price distortion obtained in the literature under monopoly conditions (e.g., Wolinsky 1983; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Bagwell 1991; Judd and Riordan 1994) . We summarize these insights in the following lemma: 
Thus, for any given incumbent's price, p I , the H-type entrant selects a higher price under quality signaling than under complete information.
Optimal Pricing Strategy of the Incumbent Under Signal
Jamming. When the incumbent engages in signal jamming, for any given entrant's price p E , the strategic consideration facing the incumbent is not only to maximize his profit but also to select a price "high enough" to deter quality signaling by the H-type entrant. The incumbent's pricing problem when he attempts to jam the entrant's quality signaling can be modeled as Program P3Ј given in Table 5 .
In Equation (T5.2), (p I ) refers to the H-type en-
p E trant's reaction function when consumers believe her quality to be q E and is obtained from Equation (3) 
H,H
P E Note that in the above program we do not need to impose an additional constraint to ensure that the incumbent prefers signal jamming even when he knows that the entrant is the L type. The reasoning is as follows: Any low-quality entrant not only realizes the high-quality entrant's incentive to separate but also realizes the incumbent's incentive to signal jam such a separation. Suppose the incumbent did not engage in signal jamming, realizing the entrant's quality to be low. In that case, the low-quality entrant will mimic the high-quality entrant's optimal price, avoiding separation, and force the incumbent to the signal-jamming price to create weak defection to the first best. In other words, signal jamming by the incumbent makes separation by the high-type costlier but makes mimicking by the L-type more attractive. An alternative way of gleaning the intuition as to why the incumbent will not defect from the signal-jamming equilibrium even when he faces a L-type entrant is stated in the spirit of the forward induction in Cho and Kreps (1987) . The L-type entrant makes the following statement to the incumbent: "I know that you will try to prevent the H-type entrant from signaling quality by choosing signal-jamming prices. Therefore, the only way the H-type entrant can signal quality
The following lemma characterizes the incumbent's reaction function under signal jamming:
Lemma 5. The optimal pricing strategy of the incumbent, for any given price of the entrant, when the incumbent attempts to jam quality signaling is given by
The following proposition characterizes the signaljamming equilibrium: Proposition 9. In the signal-jamming equilibrium, the optimal prices of the incumbent and the entrant are given by the simultaneous solution to Equations (8) Note that in the signal-jamming equilibrium, both the H-type and the L-type entrants follow the same pricing strategies. In other words, the H-type entrant "pools" with the L-type entrant. Since both the H-type and the L-type entrants follow the same strategy, the pricing strategy of the incumbent is also not contingent on the quality type of the competing entrant firm. Further, observe that both the entrant and the incumbent follow the same pricing strategies, regardless of whether the entrant is the H type or the L type. Hence, on observing the incumbent's and the entrant's prices, the consumers cannot rationally infer the entrant's "true" quality. Therefore, consumers' posterior beliefs coincide with their priors.
Numerical Example
We illustrate the delayed reaction with a numerical example. Let the quality of the incumbent product, q I , be 200, the quality of the H-type entrant ( ) be 175, and the incumbent's profit under signal jamming improves by 55% over the case when the incumbent allows the entrant to signal quality. Thus, the sequence of the observed price of the incumbent is 115 (pre-entry), 112.05 (signal jamming), and 40.96 (complete information). In this example, of the total decrease in the incumbent's price of 74.04, only 4% of the price decrease occurs immediately after entry while 96% of the decrease occurs after entrant's quality becomes known.
We repeated the numerical simulation for a large set of values for the parameters of the model. We find that in most cases, a signal-jamming equilibrium exists. We find that the incumbent's price path, consistent with the phenomenon of delayed response, is quite robust.
Experimental Validation
The observational implication of the model is that the optimal strategy of the incumbent may be a delayed defensive response. As discussed earlier, most of the empirical studies in the literature find significant delay in defensive reactions (Robinson 1988; Bowman and Gatignon 1995) , which can be viewed as confirming our model predictions. Even though the empirical studies are not inconsistent, they do not constitute a "test" of the theory in the strict sense of the term. For instance, in the existing data sets (e.g., PIMS) we do not know the extent of consumer uncertainty of the quality of the new product. Neither the cost structure of the incumbent or entrant is known and no data are available on the temporal pattern of the revelation of the entrant's quality information. These difficulties are not unique to our model. In fact, any rigorous testing Table 6 Results from Experiment 1 52.79 (19.12) of any theory based on asymmetric information faces the same set of limitations.
In an attempt to test the proposed theory, we conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, we tested for the plausibility of the rationale proposed in this paper.
19 In addition, Experiment 1 also compared the proposed explanation with the competing explanations proposed in the literature. Given the data limitations, the appropriate way to test our model was to begin by testing (a) the face validity of the model and (b) by comparing the explanatory "power" for the proposed explanation relative to others. We did this by providing decision makers with information about consumers' quality uncertainty and the timing of quality revelation. The respondents were asked to conjecture about the most likely explanation accounting for a firm's delayed response. Specifically, we tested our explanation relative to the explanations proposed by Robinson (1988) and Bowman and Gatignon (1995) . Experiment 2 constituted a more direct test of the behavioral underpinning of our model.
Experiment 1
Subjects. The subjects were 81 full-time MBA and evening MBA students enrolled in a marketing communications class at a private university on the East Coast. The years of work experience of the subjects ranged from three to six years. Subjects were asked to take part in a marketing decision study. They were asked to read a scenario that described a decision made by a firm and then were given a list of potential post hoc reasons as to why the decision was made by the firm. Subjects were asked to indicate the likelihood that the decision was made for the explanations provided to them.
Subjects were told that a firm Oldpro, a subsidiary of Consolidated Industries, was in the business of manufacturing and selling heavy diesel engines. Oldpro was an established and well-respected firm. A year ago, a firm Gamma entered the diesel engine market and introduced a new product to compete against Oldpro. Further, subjects were informed that Gamma's 19 We thank the acting editor, Rajiv Lal, for suggesting this experiment. Though this experiment was not the first conducted chronologically, we report it as Experiment 1 for logical consistency. product was superior in quality relative to Oldpro's product. Oldpro had to make a decision on how to respond to Gamma's introduction. Subjects were then told that Oldpro decided not to respond immediately to Gamma's new launch-they waited for one year and then reduced their prices.
Subjects were provided with a total of seven explanations, six of which were hypothesized in the literature as explanations for delayed competitive responses (Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Robinson 1988) . Subjects were instructed to read all the explanations before responding to the question "How likely is it that Oldpro's management made the decision for the reason listed?" on a 100-point scale anchored between not at all likely to very likely. The explanations in the order given to the subjects were: (i) There is inertia in Oldpro's management-they respond slowly; (ii) The market is growing at a very high rate; (iii) If Oldpro immediately reduced their prices, customers would infer that Gamma's product was of high quality; (iv) Oldpro does nor perceive Gamma to be a threat; (v) The diesel engine market is not very important to Consolidated; (vi) Oldpro's capacity utilization is high; and (vii) It is very expensive for customers to switch to the new technology. Table 6 summarizes the means and standard deviations of the responses for the seven explanations provided to the subjects. As can be seen, the subjects judged the delayed reaction of reducing prices by the incumbent to have occurred most likely because an immediate reaction would have indicated the entrant's quality to the consumers. The only other statistically significant explanations for the delayed reaction by the incumbent were those related to consumer switching costs and the incumbent's high capacity utilization. We believe that these results provide strong evidence that the proposed explanation has high face validity relative to the alternative explanations provided in the literature. Furthermore, the "explanatory power" of the proposed theory was found to be satisfactory.
Results and Discussions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we tested for the face validity of the proposed model. In addition, we demonstrated that, relative to the competing explanations in the literature, the proposed explanation for delayed responses by the incumbent was observed to be the most intuitively appealing. As a further verification of the theory, in this experiment we tested a behavioral assumption underlying the theory. Recall that, in the signal-jamming equilibrium, the incumbent adopts the same pricing strategy whether he faces a high-or a low-quality entrant. Such an equilibrium is supported by the consumers' (off-equilibrium) belief that immediate reaction in terms of a sharp price cut by the incumbent would mean that the entrant's quality is high. In Experiment 2, we verify whether or not an incumbent's response to a new product entry with respect to a change in price impacts consumers' quality perceptions of the entrant.
Subjects. Two pools of subjects were used. The first set comprised full-time MBA and evening MBA students enrolled in a product management class. The second set comprised undergraduate students enrolled in a marketing management class. The subjects were asked to participate in a experiment pertaining to a purchase decision task. Seventy-six graduate students and 65 undergraduate students agreed to participate in the experiment.
Methodology.
A single factor between-subjects design (price change) with three levels was employed. The subjects were asked to assume the role of purchasing agents in an organization. Specifically, they were told that their job involved selecting suppliers for industrial components. Next, they were presented with the purchase scenario. The scenario stated that they had been buying a component from supplier X.
Further, supplier X's quality had been rated by the purchasing department to be 50 on a 100-point scale (where 100 denoted excellent quality and 0 denoted very poor quality). Supplier X had been charging the firm $1,000 per component. The subjects were then told that a supplier Y was entering the market with a competitive component. The purchasing department would have an opportunity to choose between the two suppliers at the next purchase occasion. Finally, subjects were told that they had just received a new price list from the incumbent X. The manipulation involved the change in X's price: either a decrease to $700, an increase to $1,300, or no change at $1,000.
Based on the information provided in the scenario, the subjects were asked to state their quality perceptions of the new entrant on a 100-point scale (100 ‫ס‬ excellent quality; 0 ‫ס‬ very poor quality). They were also asked an open-ended question to explain why they thought the incumbent firm had responded by changing prices.
Results and Discussion. We examined the impact of price response by the incumbent on the quality perceptions of the entrant. The results were consistent with the prediction that, relative to a price increase or no price change, a price decrease by the incumbent will lead to more positive evaluations of the entrant's quality. The results are summarized in Table 7 . The results for the undergraduates correspond very closely to those found for the graduate subjects. For the graduate pool, subjects who were given the incumbent price decrease condition judged the quality of the entrant more favorably (Q ‫ס‬ 65.36) than the subjects who were given the incumbent price increase condition (Q ‫ס‬ 47.24; F ‫ס‬ 12.38; p Ͻ 0.01) or the subjects who were given the incumbent no change condition (Q ‫ס‬ 52.80; F ‫ס‬ 27.67; p Ͻ 0.01). Similarly, for the undergraduate pool, the subjects exposed to the incumbent price decrease condition rated the entrant's quality more favorably (Q ‫ס‬ 64.05) than the subjects who were exposed to the incumbent price increase condition (Q ‫ס‬ 46.66; F ‫ס‬ 4.96; p Ͻ 0.05) or the subjects who were exposed to the incumbent no change condition (Q ‫ס‬ 53.72; F ‫ס‬ 15.08; p Ͻ 0.01).
We also examined the responses to the open-ended questions to confirm whether the subjects interpreted the competitive responses as revelation of private information held by the incumbent regarding the quality of the new entrant. By and large, the stated rationales provided confirmatory evidence about the proposed theory. The results are consistent with the notion that competitive actions by an incumbent to new product entries lead to quality inferences about the entrant. Specifically, as compared with price increases or no price changes, price decreases by the incumbent result in higher quality perceptions of the entrant.
Conclusions
Responding to new product introductions is one of the major strategic issues in marketing. Response time by competitors is an important component of that strategy. Though most normative models have implicitly assumed or explicitly advocated quick competitive reactions (Hauser and Shugan 1983; Kumar and Sudarshan 1988; Porter 1985) , a number of empirical studies have found that defensive reactions are often delayed (Robinson 1988; Bowman and Gatignon 1995) .
In this paper, we provide a rationale as to why a delayed reaction may be the optimal strategy for an incumbent firm. Previous explanations have suggested that delayed responses result from either managerial perceptions of a lack of potential threat from new product introductions or a lack of managerial competence to respond quickly. We suggest that, under certain conditions, a delayed response may be an optimal or efficient strategy when there is uncertainty about the entrant's quality. Succinctly, an immediate reaction in the form of a lower price by the incumbent firm may cause consumers to believe that the entrant's product quality is high. Therefore, an incumbent may be better off by delaying the price response until consumers learn the quality of the entrant's product over time through experience and word of mouth. We find strong experimental evidence supporting the underlying premise and explanation of our analysis.
The literature in marketing strategy has traditionally focused on either the impact of marketing actions on consumers or the impact of the strategy on competitive reactions (Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen 1989; Hanssens 1980) . In this paper, we highlight the importance of considering both the competitors and consumers simultaneously in examining the incumbent firm's optimal reaction strategy. This approach becomes extremely important when consumers are able to observe competitive actions or reactions. We acknowledge that some reactions may be unobservable (e.g., trade promotions) to consumers but believe that most actions are detectable to both the competitors and consumers.
The managerial implications of this paper is that well-established incumbent firms should be cautious in the implementation of their defensive responses to new product introductions of uncertain quality by competitors. Of particular concern are situations where the reactions are easily observable by consumers. A strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously, leading consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor's product.
We have shown that when the entrant uses price to signal her quality, under certain conditions, it may be optimal for the incumbent not to react aggressively in the first period. 20 The entrant can use other signals as well. In addition to price, 21 the entrant has access to other signaling instruments. For example, advertising (Nelson 1974; Milgrom and Roberts 1986) , umbrella branding (Wernerfelt 1988), retailer reputation (Chu and Chu 1994) , product line selection (Balachander and Srinivasan 1994) , product upgrades (Padmanabhan, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 1997), and 20 Another explanation for the delayed reaction is that an incumbent may be uncertain about the entrant's financial commitment/resources. This issue needs further investigation. We thank Professor Birger Wernerfelt for this observation.
21
See Srinivasan (1991) , Desai and Srinivasan (1995) , and Balachander and Srinivasan (1998) for other marketing analytical models where price is the only signal instrument. money-back guarantees (Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995) can also serve as signaling mechanisms for entrants. In future research work, we hope to examine the impact of alternate signaling instruments in determining competitive reactions.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Under monopoly, the demand function facing firm I is given by (p) ‫ס‬ 1 ‫מ‬ (p/q I ), so that the incumbent's profit Ņ Solving (A.6) in p I yields the expression for the optimal pre-entry price of the incumbent. ▫ 22 The authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally to the paper. We thank the acting editor, Rajiv Lal, the editor, Rick Staelin, and three anonymous reviewers of this journal for their comments. We thank the seminar participants at HKUST, Indian Institute of Management at Calcutta, University of Chicago, UCLA, and UC at Berkeley for their comments. An earlier version of this work was presented at the Marketing Science Conference at Sydney. This work was partly supported by the Beatrice Companies Faculty Research Fund (at the GSB, University of Chicago) to the second author. The usual disclaimer applies. a belief, however, overturns the suggested pooling equilibrium. Extending the logic, any pooling equilibria with prices lower than the signal-jamming equilibrium prices can be eliminated. Thus, we establish that the focal signal-jamming pooling equilibrium is unique. ▫
